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1. Introduction
To explain the success and hurdles of mobile Internet services in Japan and the West, Funk
(2001, 2004) uses the concepts of network effects (Shapiro & Varian, 1999) and disruptive
technologies (Christensen, 1997) that we will adopt in this paper. Patterns of industry
convergence are generally thought to occur at a number of different levels: the product-market
level, the technology level and the firm level (von Tunzelmann, 1988). Mobile phone products
are increasingly compatible with standard Internet file formats (MP3, MPEG,
Real, and windows formats) and the technology richness of high-end phone contents are getting
close to that of the fixed-line Internet, while keeping the mobile-phone’s near-ubiquitous
geographical reach. On the product and technology level most handsets in 2005 combined
camera and media player functionalities. We claim that industry convergence between IT and
telecoms, at the firm level is increasingly being achieved through standardisation and the
dissemination among actors possessing competences in mobile service delivery technologies.
This paper utilises “coordination costs” (Clemons et al, 1993) to provide a study lens to view the
content value chain in Japan and the EU. This study lens enables us to identify actors and their
business strategies enacted between 2000 and 2005 in both markets. The business strategy
includes the positioning in the value chain and technology choices in content delivery activities
among actors. Hughes’ (1983) technology system approach, and the view of innovation as
overcoming reverse salients, is used to describe the current status of mobile service delivery
platforms within the mobile Internet technology system.
Disruptive technologies improve certain product features while sacrificing others, and are
typically more appropriate for new customers than existing ones. Christensen’s (1997) study of
the hard disk drive industry in the 1970s and 1980s, found disruptive technologies at work, as
established manufacturers were not interested in supplying smaller disk drives, with smaller
memory (and margins) while new entrants took the new customers. This trend was repeated for
minicomputers, PCs and laptops. However, Funk (2004) notes that some technologies are
disruptive for some incumbents and not for others, depending on previous technology base and
choices: Sharp and Seiko commercialized LCDs faster than RCA (who was the first firm to
develop LCDs) since this new technology was not disruptive for one of their current markets
(calculators that required low power consumption) while it was disruptive for computers
(insufficient speed), which was the main market for semiconductors in the US. Another aspect of
disruptive technologies is their starting point from a lower performance level, and what
Christensen et al (2002) calls “overshoot” the demands and expectations of customers when
entering the mass market. Disruptive technologies often offer a higher performance increase than
the industry average. This would ensure a certain performance “margin” in new innovation from
disruptive technology and partly explain why an industry does not take on a homogenous
technology form.
Network externalities, increasing returns and path dependencies can be summarized as network
effects. In short, interconnected actors are affected by each other (positively or negatively), even
if they are only indirectly connected (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). The value of a network increases
with the number of actors connected, in our case the number of handsets that can easily be
reached by one service delivery platform. Innovation is often described as path dependent where
innovators and users accumulate sunk costs and become locked-in. If a user base is tied to a
technological standard, increasing returns therefore applies to the standard too. This can be
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summarised in a standards reinforcement mechanism which also explains how a standard that
builds up an early install base before competitors create path dependency among customers
(Grindley, 1995)
“Coordination costs” is the cost incurred by the firm in coordinating with other organisations or
potentially pricing the product (Clemons et al, 1993). The term coordination cost is interpreted in
a broader sense to include the cost of exchanging information and incorporating that information
into decision processes, as well as the cost incurred by the firm due to delays in the
communication channel. Typically a good IT infrastructure, such as email, Internet, and common
databases decreases the coordination costs.
“Reverse salients” are used by Hughes (1983) to explain how technical innovation focus around
the elimination of obstacles to growth, called reverse salients. Technical artifacts are typically
part of a technological system (the mobile Internet in our case), where growth patterns are driven
by a need to maximise the load factor (the ratio of average usage, which determines revenue)
until a peak is reached, which determines the necessary capital investment. Hence innovation can
be seen as a system of interdependent technology components gradually moving forward as
pockets of resistance (reverse salients) to system innovation are overcome.
Following a description of key characteristics of service delivery platforms we give a brief
history to how the mobile Internet developed in Japan and the EU, showing the importance of
content delivery, and identify key players. Then we describe their business strategies. Thirdly we
identify the key technologies of mobile service delivery, and show that components are
increasingly becoming standardized in this previously fragmented part of the mobile industry.
2. Key Characteristics of Mobile Service Delivery
The major technologies enabling the mobile Internet can be thought to be, and include the
interfaces between: Infrastructure networks, handsets, and service (or content) delivery systems.
Both infrastructure networks and handsets have entered a high level of standardisation across
markets, and mass production for the global market. But service delivery platforms are only
partly standardised, and only recently started to develop from proprietary and local systems,
towards generic modules and the mass market. In Hughes’ (1983) terms, content delivery
systems are technology components currently defined as a “reverse salient” to the further take off
and dissemination of the mobile Internet. Massive resources are currently being invested by all
four key actors to achieve new service delivery innovations that would enable a higher output of
the whole mobile Internet system. Strategy Analytics (2005) estimate that US$175m is being
invested worldwide in SDPs in 2005 and US$325m in 2007, then rising to US$375m in 2008.
Much technical progress have been done since 1999 but the service delivery platforms could still
be seen as a reverse salient on its way to be corrected.
When the mobile Internet became available around 1999 in both the EU and Japan, delivering
content was a disruptive set of technologies for all content holders but new content start-ups.
None of the contents (images, sound, text) used on the Internet could easily be applied on mobile
phones due to different browsers, mark-up language, file formats, or due to general constraints
from the handsets. For users the content was expensive, difficult to use, and of poor quality. We
argue that continuing standardisation and convergence of content formats and delivery
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technologies have been instrumental in providing the basis for new business models. This makes
the mobile Internet decreasingly disruptive for several actors in the mobile delivery value chain,
and will spur new entrants. Funk claims (2004) the mobile Internet can still be disruptive for PC
Internet content providers, as they must simplify their contents for small screens and keyboards,
thereby creating a discontinuity with the previous service. Funk continues by showing how this
enabled new entrants into for example mobile shopping, by firms who are relatively weak in the
PC Internet like Tsutaya Online (records, books) and Index (perfume) in Japan. In this way
technologies can be disruptive for some firms and not others.
As new content delivery technologies enable PC (and other) actors to deliver content to already
existing phones on the market, network effects support an increasing value for mobile service
delivery technologies, providing a positive feed-back process between users and providers. Due
to previous success the EU carriers and service providers focused on business users and
expensive devices for their first WAP services (business users and roaming was the most
profitable user segment). Partly for the same reasons, (Japanese companies rarely provide
employees with business phones) Japanese carriers had an early success among entertainment
contents, with service providers early setting their targets on young users and consumers. There
was also an early focus on performance-based positioning of contents in the i-mode portal, which
provided trust with the users and clear incentives for content providers. Overall, Japanese
carriers were quicker in interpreting signals of network effects and positive feed-back from
consumers than its European counterparts. As a contrast, the low replacement rate of handsets
and lacking customer relationship management from carriers towards service providers in
Scandinavia (the leading GSM market at the time) exemplify how network effects were kept
back from work in 1999 to 2002 in the EU (Kärrberg & Sigurdson, 2002).
In our analysis we have chosen the following six activities as markers of the content delivery
value chain:
Content ownership: The creation and possession of analogue/digital contents
Content aggregation: Aggregation, pre-formatting and storage of content for the purpose of
service delivery
Service delivery: To deliver contents in the right format to any handset.
Billing mediation: Charge any customer for contents according to regulations and purchase event.
Portal management: To present an attractive portal where users consume contents. Deployment
of search engines displaying the portal’s content in a compelling way.
Content approval, network access: Approval process and guidelines for content before going live
on the carrier network.
The activity flow above is modelled in figure 1 and is valid for both WAP/i-mode and SMS:
[Fig 1]
This division serves our purpose of describing how actors have changed their value chain focus
(business strategy) between year 2000 and 2005 in Japan and the EU.
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In the selection process of actors to study, one comes up with the key industry actors: carriers,
handset makers, infrastructure makers, content providers, retail brand makers, enablers, and users.
However, from a content delivery point of view, networks are owned and managed by the
carriers, and the handsets are either the same to all carriers as in the EU or procured and
developed jointly with the carriers, as in Japan. In the perspective of content delivery, handsets
and networks are included in the business strategy of the carrier. We therefore choose to focus
our analysis on four actors: carriers, content providers (also called content aggregators), enablers
(called service delivery platform providers), and retail brand makers. Handsets and infrastructure
features are exogenous factors for all actors but the carriers, so we inscribe it in the carrier
business strategy. Users, their preferences, and other demand factors are assumed to be taken
into account by the business strategies of all four actors. Especially, we look at technology
choice as part of the business strategy, and map the activities in figure 1 against underlying
technologies in figure 2:
[Fig 2]
The independent technologies used within each activity are explained below:
Ingestion: Analogue and digital contents converted into suitable digital format
Compression: Digital raw contents need to be trans-coded into all needed formats fitting the
numerous handsets
Content management system: When compressed into the right formats, contents are stored in a
content management system.
Meta data capture: Content is wrapped in descriptive data, such as “title”, “file name”, “author”
etc, that is needed when displaying and managing it correctly.
Device discovery: From the user agent, the SDP can identify the handset.
On-the-fly trans-coding: For images, an on-the-fly trans-coding can be done from one raw file
into the format fitting a certain user profile.
DRM: Before being delivered contents are wrapped in metadata deciding what rights the user has
(e.g. forward-lock). Depending on handset capabilities, this should be acted upon by the SDP.
Download manager: It is necessarily to handle unstable connections, communication between
java clients and the SDP, and the actual download mechanism that varies.
Media player: To deliver streaming, MMS contents and other special formats to the handset.
Billing mediation: To check if the user has money to spend, and log his purchases with the
carrier who provides the monthly statement/subtracts from prepaid user accounts.
Site builder: To avoid coding in multiple mark-up languages, or simply drag-and-drop design
systems. Site-builders automate this process.
Search engine: When new content is added, it is being registered in the search engine, content
providers can bid for key words, and users easily find what they look for
Third party management: Carriers and MVNOs (Mobile Virtual Network Operators) with tens of
suppliers can automate the sign-up process of suppliers, enforcement of SLAs (Service Level
Agreements) for bandwidth usage among others.
Limitations to realigning activities and acquire technologies in the value chain are represented in
this paper by coordination costs for vertical integration and horizontal cooperation.
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3. Technology Standards & Initial Business Strategies, 1999-2002
When comparing the EU and Japan the first major difference is in the usage of GSM versus PDC
as the network standard. At a first look, it would seem as the EU had a head-start as GSM is a
global standard and PDC is not. The first mobile Internet services in 1999 focused on
information services both in Japan and the EU, as carriers believed business users would drive
revenues. But as Funk (2004) points out, the mobile Internet acted as a disruptive technology for
existing and advanced Internet applications (business usage), whereas simple entertainment
content (consumers) were much easier to enable and sell. High coordination costs in Europe kept
content providers from expanding cross-boarder sales, as incumbents all had different billing
systems, portal policies and regulations. So it turns out the larger size of the EU market didn’t
have any positive effects for the mobile Internet compared to Japan in the starting phase. There
are many similarities when looking back in time: Both markets were pioneering the mobile
Internet, and WAP even had a head start over i-mode (and WAP was adopted by KDDI, the
second carrier) as a mark-up language. Handsets had black and white screens and no ring tones
or java games were available in Japan or the EU during launch in 1999. Messaging, the “killer
application”, took off already back in the mid-90s as the first data application in both markets,
and still in 2005 provide most of the non-voice revenues.
There are also clear structural differences: The market fragmentation and power struggle that
took place in Europe between handset makers and carriers didn’t take place in Japan. From the
beginning PDC ensured that no roaming to other countries was possible, so the Japanese handset
makers became suppliers to the carrier handset wholesale departments, especially to the giant
Nippon Telecom and Telegraph (NTT) and its daughter company DoCoMo. The “always-on”
packet networks (GPRS) in Japan were not available until 2002 in most EU markets. Another
major difference was the clear value proposition that Japanese carriers offered compared to EU
carriers.
Network effects explain how these important differences became magnified into success in Japan
and a conceived failure in the EU. Feed-back processes (Grindley, 1995) in Japan early produced
a few profitable content providers, that inspired other content providers, more users signed up,
and carriers (NTT DoCoMo mainly) expanded its content departments. An existing world-class
cluster of entertainment service companies in Tokyo (gaming, animations, karaoke) also
contributed to a rapid mobilisation of production resources into the new mobile Internet
distribution channel (Kärrberg & Marnung, 2001).

4. The Value Chain Evolves: Service Delivery Platforms 2002-2005
The internationalization of content sales in the EU (and bureaucratic carrier organisations) gave
birth to the SMS and WAP brokers, an industry actor still unknown in Japan (in 2005) as offportal billing is not possible. Content aggregators specializing in carrier relations developed both
in Japan and the EU, but didn’t take off in the EU until 2001 with premium SMS. Specialized
content providers emerged both in Japan and the EU before 2000, when Japanese content
providers brought established brands to the mobile business (Bandai/Disney, Cybird/Popeye,
SEGA), whereas many EU content providers (CPs) tried to create their own contents. The
service delivery platform market emerged in Japan as a clear industry segment in 2002-2005,
whereas the EU roaming challenge early on called for these systems to efficiently connect
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service providers to multiple carriers in different markets. A strong trend is for retail brands to
build their own portals in the EU and charge for content via premium SMS, without dealing
directly with carriers. The carrier portals are gradually decreasing as entry point and customer
education arena in the EU.
Advertising and retail brand makers are increasingly using both mobile marketing and Internet
web pages for an optimal media mix of geographical “reach” and content “richness” (Funk,
2004). Firms are compensating for the low richness of the mobile Internet by integrating it with
other media. As the mobile Internet has been a disruptive technology and not easy to integrate
with other media until recently, mobile advertising has been done separately. The only area at the
moment seemingly far away from PC and mobile phone convergence is gaming, due to user
interface restrictions and the usage of handset-specific java files.
In both the EU and Japan, service delivery platforms have not yet overshot the functional needs
(Christensen et al, 2002), as most customers ask for customized solutions. This is partly due to
the fact that no dominant design has yet emerged for coordinating underlying technologies in
service delivery platforms. SDP providers have worked hard to offer the underlying technologies
in fig. 2 as independent modules with connecting APIs. But the typical sales options still consist
of either new customers (typically media retail brands, such as TV, radio, entertainment) willing
to accept the disruptive technology, or established customers who either demand very high
services levels (typically carriers) and/or extensive integration with existing systems (typically
content aggregators). As the underlying technologies increasingly deal with standard Internet
content formats, we argue that the boundaries between underlying delivery technologies blur,
which would inspire vertical integration (Christensen et al, 2002). But the SDP product
boundaries (the perception among customer what functionality they want from the “black box”)
could increasingly become modularised as dominant product designs will emerge, which would
imply room for horizontal disintegration. Nevertheless, a tendency in the market during 2005
was to address the reverse salient of service delivery systems by vertical integration. Mostly
between mobile SDP companies and other IT companies who see synergy effects between
mobile and standard Internet delivery systems and to deliver full solutions to carriers and retails
brands. But also telecom infrastructure providers (both Nokia and Ericsson to name two), have
deployed service delivery offerings as they move aggressively into maintenance of carrier
networks. This vertical integration makes it increasingly difficult for smaller SDP vendors to
survive due to increased cost pressure and service demands.
Hughes’ concept of “reverse salient” (1983) can be used to see how in both the EU and Japan
acquisitions of competitors and partners in the service delivery space sped up the integration of
the content delivery process from 1999 and onwards: In the EU disproportionate resources from
venture capitalists poured into marketing towards carriers to break their “not invented here”
attitude towards outsourcing of key components in the delivery architecture. In Japan NTT
DoCoMo broke new ground already in 1999 by overcoming the coordination challenge in the
value chain: By doing it themselves with a compelling business model and technological lead the
telecoms industry in Japan came to accept the i-mode approach, and much potential coordination
cost in the value chain among the other actors was saved in the process.
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Some key driving forces for integration and convergence between the mobile and fixed Internet
in 2005 can be summarised in:
•

Technology components of the service delivery platform are becoming standardised
and smaller players are merging into larger ones as margins decrease.

•

Carriers want to buy standard and exchangeable components after many experiments
with small and proprietary systems the last 5 years.

•

Established media companies want to deliver their content by themselves, not only
directly to carriers. They desire to plug into the carrier’s billing systems (through
billing mediators), but deliver contents to end customers by themselves.

5. Business Strategy & Technology Choices 2000-2005
The mobile service value chain and related business strategies can be seen through our lens of
coordination costs. All four actors have overlapping and unique core competences: carriers run
their networks and bill customers for accessing them, content aggregators specialise in finding
and deliver content to carriers or directly to customers, vendors of service delivery platforms
focus on technology and delivery mechanisms, and retail brand makers look to expand with
already successful products into the mobile distribution channel.
In the value chain typically two large actors have much resources to spend: the carriers and the
retails brands. But neither of them have originated in the mobile telecom industry, and in many
cases lack a differentiated view of mobile consumer behaviour (mainly carriers) and underlying
technologies (foremost retails brands). The typically smaller companies in content aggregation
and service delivery often come from the same background: Set up just before or after 2000 by
big telecom company drop-outs in order to exploit new business opportunities. Most content
aggregators before 2003 used their own, or the carrier content delivery mechanisms. Many
aggregators or SDP vendors still engage in both contents and service delivery solutions.
Financial strains have been a close companion to most aggregators and SDP providers, with a
few striking exceptions in primarily Japan (Bandai, Cybird, Index e.g.) but also the EU.
Coordination costs for accessing the right branded content, often outside the national market, has
been typical problems for aggregators. SDP providers, due to IT and telecoms convergence, have
had the advantage of increasingly working with standard internet technologies, and thereby
become partners with or subsidiaries to other IT companies. As technology providers, some SDP
providers suffer from lacking information on consumer behaviour, or coordination costs in
explaining and market their solutions to their customers. There are no clear activity boundaries
between SDP vendors and the other actors, as service enabling technology is utilised throughout
the value chain by several actors and no dominant designs can function as bench marks. The
activity boundaries (Figure 1) could in many cases be argued to not contain necessary
information required for an efficiently functioning seller-buyer market to exist. Management and
integration, rather than markets, constitute the most efficient coordinating mechanism across
such interfaces, called “interdependent interfaces” by Christensen et al (2002). This could be one
of many explanations to ongoing mergers and acquisitions involving SDP suppliers in recent
years.
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Since the beginning of i-mode in Japan in 1999, WAP/i-mode billing and not SMS billing on the
carrier portal is the only way of charging for contents. Successful entrants have emphasized the
carrier portal. Human relations and trust with the carrier is sometimes more important than
technology choice. In the EU the emergence of SMS billing as the dominant transaction form
has enabled the off-portal business (and billing aggregators) to grow substantially, where direct
contact with the carrier is not necessary for the service provider. Japan in 2000 was dominated
by 10-20 large content providers and retail brands working directly with the carriers. These
included Bandai, Cybird, Index, Giga Networks, and SEGA. The original content providers from
1999 that showed “loyalty” at the beginning towards DoCoMo were rewarded with special
relationships and became aggregators. Other content providers often had to take considerable
coordination costs for communicating with the carriers through these aggregators. Service
delivery platform providers worked to some degree with retail brands. The carriers coordinated
portal management, handset releases, and got their revenues mainly from traffic/packet fees and
a much smaller share from the content fees (the carriers kept 9% of content fees). The content
provider could keep 91% of content revenues, but packet fees constituted the bulk of revenues
from the mobile Internet system at the time (which NTT DoCoMo didn’t share). Only monthly
subscription was available as the charging method. It was a clear business case for all parties and
coordination costs were directed towards publishing content on the official portal.
The EU in 2000 saw the carriers trying to do “everything” by themselves: aggregating and even
creating content. The revenue share for content providers was generally less than 50%, and users
paid for transmission time, not traffic, as necessary GPRS systems and related micro billing
systems weren’t available until 2002 in most markets. There was no clear business case for
content providers, so SMS outside the carrier portal became the revenue driver once carriers
opened up their billing systems for third parties.
In 2005 the successful model in Japan hasn’t changed substantially. The same players occupy the
same space with the exception of large retail brands managing their relation with carriers directly,
and off-portal sites for advertising and other consumer interaction (non-charged) has been
booming. Interaction between web pages and the mobile Internet has also increased.
In 2005 the EU looks very different from the awkward situation in 2000. The carrier portals have
been marginalized for SMS services (that have gone off-portal) and service delivery platforms
have become a key element for cost effective mobile Internet sites in the growing competition
among carriers, retail brands and content providers. Several carriers have even outsourced portal
management and focus solely on wholesale of data and SMS. To some extent service delivery
platforms emerging as system products in 2002-2005 was a disruptive technology to most
content aggregators and even carriers who had developed their own proprietary service delivery
mechanisms. But many carriers in the EU (Japanese carriers only share their billing API) chose
to procure new service delivery platforms, or at least provide open APIs to their SMS (most) and
WAP (fewer) billing systems to trusted partners between 2003 and 2005. Most retail brands
(including game makers) by 2003 hadn’t ventured into mobile service delivery, so SDPs were
not a disruptive technology to them. Carriers and brands launching mobile services are
increasingly concerned with commercial aspects of content editing and retailing rather than the
basic functionality of handset rendering and content management. Customer business benefits
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rather than technology have become selling points and the main source for coordination costs for
the SDP providers.
[Figure 3]
Notes to figure 3:
• Arrows denote main areas of activity and dotted arrows activities that were undertaken
often enough to affect the competitive landscape.
• Mobile CP (mobile content provider) is defined as a company started up for the sole
purpose of creating, aggregating and/or distributing content via the mobile Internet or
SMS.
• SDP providers enable the other actors to publish raw content files for all handsets.
• The clear activity zone of Japanese carriers can be compared to the wide scope of EU
carriers in year 2000.
[Figure 4]
Notes to figure 4:
•

•

The reasons for increasing market demand for SDPs are different in Japan and the EU.
Japan: network effects and success of the mobile Internet means that sites are launched
rapidly, but only about 10% are profitable. To cut costs on manual updates is crucial.
The EU: The technical complexity of delivering contents on multiple networks makes it
necessary to focus on core skills and partner with other value chain players.
The boarder between the 4 actors is blurring in the EU, as technology focus and profit
zones are changing. Some technologies become commoditized (content management
systems, compression) while others evolve as increasingly important with special
suppliers (site builders, DRM). But the over-all trend is that technology matters less and
fully serviced storefront offerings attract the cash rich players: retail brands and carriers.

Figure 5 shows that although the same technology interaction is used in Japan and the EU for
content delivery, what differs between the Japanese and EU market is to what extent certain
technologies are used or omitted, which in turn interact with the business strategy of the four key
actors (carriers, content aggregators, SDP providers, retail brands). Increasing cost focus will
most probably create a traditional two-fold segmentation in a maturing market: specialized
component makers, and large system retailers who market off-the-shelf solutions. It can be
argued that similar patterns of technology convergence in the SDP markets of Japan and the EU
is a strong indicator of a global IT and telecom convergence in general, as the mobile Internet
and the PC Internet systems are converging.
[Figure 5]
The creative process of producing “mobile” (audio, video, games, images) contents is
decreasingly held back by limitations of the handsets. This supports two parallel developments:
integration of the steps in the delivery mechanism, and decreasing need of reformatting the
content. Nevertheless there are several steps before even a standard MP3 file can be delivered
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from a content provider to the handset in a correct way. Not to mention an analogue image that
needs even more formatting before being downloaded to the user handset. From an initial WAP
focus in the EU, SMS came to take over as delivery format during 2002-2005 in the EU. In 2005
the mobile Internet (WAP/i-mode) has experienced a revival due to better technology and
interest from media companies to offer users a richer experience.
Software convergence in the delivery mechanism means that encoding and decoding increasingly
involve standard file formats, so that off-the shelf tools can be modified to work with mobile
content, instead of a need for custom made and expensive new tools. Similarly, handset
recognition, content management (including database tools) and delivery mechanisms were
being offered in 2005 as modules, that can be integrated through APIs (application
programming interfaces) by non-mobile players who want to offer their contents. Hosted
services make the technology components in an SDP even more flexible to deploy into customer
solutions. Services are simply offered on-line (DRM encapsulation, video trans-coding, third
party management) or as a fully hosted service with web interface access. Many early systems
demanded on-site deployment of servers, but the flexibility and low upfront capital expenditure
for hosted services, have increased the attractiveness of SDPs. Financial strength is also
becoming a prerequisite for bidding on projects for two reasons: Carrier and retail brands want
long-term suppliers, all partners bidding in the same project are only as strong as the weakest
link.
In figure 5 an overview is given of how the different parts of the service delivery platform
architecture have been used in the Japanese and EU markets during 2005. Carriers in Japan early
on demanded advanced device discovery and on-the-fly trans-coding for fitting images to the
screen. In the EU there has been an early interest in streaming (media player) and DRM, both
driven by the media industry. Apart from these differences, the technology focus is similar,
continuing to converge and service delivery system innovation has become a global rather than
local phenomena. A time-lag can be seen between Japan and The EU: large CPs in Japan just
started to outsource content management/adaptation, since mobile sites are larger but fewer in
Japan than in the EU, and there are only three operating carriers. SDPs are becoming a part of the
corporate IT systems with new demands: administrative systems, service extension through third
party solutions, compatibility with carrier walled gardens, quick scalability, and system
integration resources through partnerships with established IT vendors (such as IBM, Accenture
etc). As standard Internet formats become dominant, the weight of innovation will change from
specialized telecoms solutions into adapted IT solutions for the mobile space. The business
strategy chart (Fig 4) and the technology choice diagram below (Fig 5) are interdependent of
each other, as technology choice is part of managing a certain activity.
Below the increasing complexity of SDPs is visualized (Informa, 2005):
[Figure 6]
Finally we present a summary of business strategies in Japan and the EU area between 2000 and
2005:
[Table 1]
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6. Conclusions:
Before the launch of the mobile Internet in 1999 (and earlier) there was a view among observers
that technology architecture and standards would shape the necessary business strategies. But a
plethora of actors and events interplayed and business strategies rather evolved as a response to
network effects in an emerging business-technology system. We have studied the main reverse
salient in this mobile Internet technology system, mobile service delivery platforms (SDP), and
its role as indicator of these system changes. Comparing the EU with Japan we see an
exploration phase with different approaches involving disruptive technologies beginning 1999, to
a phase of differentiation of technology and business strategies, then back to a convergence of
technology where effects of coordination costs affect the reordering of the value chain in 2005
and where common themes of business strategy emerge in both markets. Other conclusions are
summarised below:
Mobile content delivery – visualized in this paper by service delivery platforms - is becoming
commoditized and technical differentiation becomes less important:
Carriers and brands launching services are more concerned with commercial aspects of content
editing and retailing than basic functionality of handset rendering and content management.
Building partnerships to become future-proof in the eyes of customers critical:
To be seen as a viable partner for multiple business scenarios, the SDP providers must leap into
building commercial networks as they become part of corporate IT systems. Financial strength is
also becoming a prerequisite for bidding on projects.
In the light of Telecoms and IT convergence, service delivery innovation will increasingly take
place in collaboration between the telecoms and IT industry:
As standard Internet formats become dominant, the weight of innovation will change from
specialized telecoms solutions into adapted IT solutions for the mobile space. SDPs evolve into
integrated components where standard Internet technology increases in importance as handsets
continue to get more advanced.
Service delivery technology choices in Japan and the EU are similar and converging:
The market is getting crowded so expertise in certain areas and open APIs being populated by
third parties are the only ways to keep up with new process innovations. Two players will remain
in the SDP segment: specialized component makers, and large system retailers who market offthe-shelf solutions. It can be argued that the similar patterns of convergence in the SDP markets
of Japan and the EU is a strong indicator of a global IT and telecom convergence in general. This
is due to the central role of SDPs as glue between end-users and the media industry.
Mobile service delivery is the last reverse salient to be solved in the mobile Internet system:
Mobile infrastructure and handset products have both entered mass production, dominant designs
prevail, and open APIs for third parties are provided. For mobile service delivery platforms, the
third main component of the mobile Internet technology system, underlying technologies have
been identified by actors in the value chain. Massive resources are currently being invested by
actors in both the mobile and PC industry to achieve new mobile service delivery innovations.
This will eventually enable a fix to the mobile service delivery as a reverse salient (Hughes,
1983) and result in a higher net output and load factor of the mobile Internet system as a whole.
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
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Figure 2. The underlying technologies for mobile service delivery
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Figure 3. Activities as business strategy among actors in mobile service delivery, 2000
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Japan, 2005
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Figure 4. Activities as business strategy among actors in mobile service delivery, 2005
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Figure 5. Technology Choices in Japan and the EU for service delivery platforms, 2005
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Figure 6. The service delivery platform evolution, the trend towards more complex systems
(Source: Informa, Informa SDP conference in Brussels, July 2005)
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Table 1
Japan/EU, comparison of business strategy, year 2000/2005
Carrier
Japan 2000

EU 2000

Portal mgm,
value chain
coordination
Content
aggregation

Content
Provider
Carrier biz
relations
Content
creation

Japan 2005

Portal mgm,
coordinate
handset
releases

Carrier
business
relation, cost
cutting and
volume

EU 2005

Portal
management,
brand
aggregation

SMS for offportal and
WAP for
carrier portals

SDP provider

Retail Brands

Systems
innovation for
CP
Systems
innovation for
carrier
Cost cutting for
CP

Distribute to
content
provider
Distribute to
carrier

Technology infra
for carriers, CP,
and brands.

Use carrier
portal for
revenues, offportal for
customer
interaction
Using off-portal
storefronts for
revenues
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